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In this paper the median voter hypothesis is revisited. Some weaknesses in its assumptions are 
discussed as well as some criticisms that have been made to the median voter model. It is 
argued that a more realistic comprehension of public choice might be achieved with the 
opening of the median voter model to the interest group influence hypothesis. A non-nested 
specification that combines the two models (MCOM) is estimated and its results are 
compared to the median voter model (MVM) and to the interest group influence model (IGM) 
results. The empirical analysis is developed for the Portuguese and the Galician municipalities. 
In addition, I tested the hypothesis of the relative political power of the median voter and of 
interest groups to vary with the dimension of the population of the municipalities. 
Finally, I analyse the existence of institutional and political differences between the two 
territories and their effects on the results. Fiscal illusion is compared for Portugal and Galicia.   1
1 – Introduction 
 
The intervention of the public sector in the economic activity and the understanding of public 
decisions have been the object of many studies in Public Choice literature. These studies join 
the economic analysis to the analysis of the behaviour of political institutions in order to learn 
about the rationality of public choice.  
 
The hypothesis of the median voter and the hypothesis of interest group influence are two 
approaches related to the demand side of the political market. So, I assume that, on the supply 
side, politicians and institutions are passive in the public choice process. They look for re-
election and do not act with any other aim than the response to median voter or interest 
groups´ demand. However, ideology is not out of my analysis, in the sense that politicians 
“feel” the demand of “ideological voters” (which can be represented by “ideological interest 
groups”), but not in the sense that politicians follow their own ideological purposes.  
 
I empirically tested the MVM, the IGM and a combined form (MCOM) for local 
governments in Portugal a nd Galicia. Local public choice is represented by “per capita” 
current municipal expenditures. 
 
Another feature of this work is the definition of two additional hypotheses: 
a) Are interest groups more successful with their activities of lobbying when the 
municipalities are larger (in terms of population)? Theory and some empirical results indicate 
that it should be so. The larger the population, the lower the probability of a single voter 
affecting public decisions (Downs, 1957). In larger municipalities there are higher costs for the 
organisation of the majority (Olson, 1965; Meltzer and Richard, 1981). Murrell (1984) 
indicates that in large municipalities there are better conditions for the organisation of 
homogeneous interest groups to exert pressure on local governments. Romer, Rosenthal and 
Munley (1992) point that voters are more influential in small municipalities. In large 
municipalities it is easier to interest groups to be successful with their pressure activities without 
the perception of the majority.   2
  b) Does the institutional shape of a political system influence the political power of the 
median voter and interest groups? I compared the results of the competing models for two 
countries (Portugal and Spain). In Spain there is an intermediate government between 
municipal governments and the central government (government of Autonomous Community); 
in Portugal this is not so. I expected that in the municipalities of Galicia (Autonomous 
Community of Spain) local interest groups would not exert so much pressure on the municipal 
governments as they do in Portuguese municipalities, because they can concentrate their efforts 
on the higher level government, whose action is closed related with the actuation of municipal 
governments (Hoyt and Toma, 1989, 1993). 
 
2 – Median voter and interest group hypotheses 
 
Bowen (1943), Downs (1957), Black (1958), Borcherding and Deacon (1972), Bergstrom 
and Goodman (1973), and Pommerehne and Schneider (1978) are some important references 
in respect to the formulation and a pplication of the median voter model (MVM). The 
institutional basis of this model is democracy (direct or representative) under the simple 
majority rule (50% +1). Its most important feature is the fact that it permits the representation 
of the aggregate demand for public goods when the preferences of the voters are unknown. 
According to Black (1958) the median voter hypothesis sheds some light on the “darkness” of 
the “Arrow Paradox”, because, under a certain number of conditions, it postulates an 
equilibrium in collective decision making. The median voter paradigm postulates that if the 
preferences of the voters for levels of public good provision are continuously ordered (for 
example, increasing), for each level we can deduce the fraction of individuals who prefer an 
inferior level. The median voter is decisive because her preferred level of provision is in the 
middle, so 50% of the individuals prefer more and 50% want less public provision. Any 
proposal different from her preference is refused by a majority of voters. So, the demand of all 
the community is the demand of the median voter. This conclusion conferred to the model an 
enormous capacity of generating empirical studies about the levels of public expenditures, 
which until then were only analysed on  an “ad hoc” basis. The median voter is usually 
represented as the family in the community, which has the median values of tax share, income 
or property.   3
The median voter model (MVM)
1 describes the aggregate demand in a community for the 
public good: 
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Cruz (1998, 2000) reviewed the literature about the MVM and found that there is a 
contradiction between the strong empirical results and the restrictive assumptions of the model. 
There are many empirical studies that use the MVM to estimate the demand for public goods
2. 
In general the model fits well to data. The price elasticity of the demand is negative (as 
expected) and lower than one in terms of absolute value (-1<b1<0). The income elasticity is 
positive (as expected), but lower than one (0<b2<1). This means that public goods are normal 
goods. The analysis of the congestion parameter associated with variable Population reveals a 
high level of congestion in the demand for goods provided by local governmental authorities. 
The model is based on strong restrictions: passive role of supply; perfect and equal information 
between voters; single-peakness of preferences; unidimensionality (only one issue is decided). 
It is also restrictive in its consequences: if the proposals tend to the median voter position, 
ideology is not important, and if the median voter is perfectly informed, the “flypaper effect” is 
not admitted. These assumptions and consequences are discussed in detail in Cruz (2000) and 
they point to the openness of the model to alternative hypotheses. On the demand side of the 
political market the interest group influence hypothesis is a strong alternative. According to it, a 
situation of imperfect competition can be represented: there is imperfect and unequal 
information among voters; the shape of voters´ preferences is not restricted; more than one 
issue can be under decision; ideological groups can lobby politicians and the “flypaper effect” 
can be explained (Dougan and Kenyon, 1988; Islam and Chondury, 1989). 
   4
There are several approaches to interest group influence: political power of bureaucracy; the 
regulation capture theory; the rent-seeking literature; the general model of Becker and 
developments; models that specific lobbying activities (contributions to candidates, composite 
utility functions, signalling models of information). The study of the role of interest groups in the 
political market is an issue of master importance in Public Choice literature (see Cruz, 2000, 
for a revision).  
 
The most studied way of lobbying are the contributions to the campaigns of the competing 
candidates (parties) in elections. We can identify two types of models: “support models”; 
“exchange models”. In “support models” it is considered that interest groups contribute to 
candidates that are closer to their preferences (independently of their probability of winning 
elections), so, in this models ideology is important. In “exchange models” groups contribute to 
candidates with a higher probability of winning elections (if their proposals are distant from 
their preferences, this is a way of capturing their future actuation, after the elections)
3. There is 
more empirical evidence that indicates that “exchange models” are more realistic (Welch, 
1980; Austen-Smith, 1987; Baron, 1989; Grier and Munger, 1991). This result is concordant 
with the empirical combination of the MVM with the interest group influence model (IGM), 
because the most preferred candidate by the median voter would be elected, but she would 
deviate from her preferences, to favour interest groups (specially in “less visible” issues). 
 
In addition, Denzau and Munger (1986), and Potters and Sloof (1996), who reviewed the 
empirical literature about the interest group lobbying indicate that higher levels of political 
competition, or of voter’s information reduce the political favours to interest groups. This is an 
important result because it shows that the IGM does not collide completely with the MVM 
and that it is important to compare and combine the two models (better information and more 
competition between voters, may be associated to less power of interest groups and more 
power of the median voter). A visible issue means that the voters are interested and informed 
about it. Politicians can combine in political platforms visible issues with less visible issues and 
favour the median voter as well as interest groups. 
   5
The empirical formulation of a model to describe interest group influence is not an easy task. 
Many lobbying activities are not measurable and frequently, secret is the “soul of business”. 
How can we measure the strength of a group? How can the conditions that incite groups to 
lobby be represented? There are several studies that use the number of interest groups to 
describe their power of influence. Others use the number of members as a proxy to their 
strength. Another alternative is the combination of the number of members or groups interested 
in one issue with the opposition voice to their aims (measured by the number of interest groups 
against, or with proxies to the level of information of voters, or to the degree of political 
competition). According to the existing information I used the number of members and the 
level of activity of interest groups as a proxy to its influence. I followed Congleton and Bennett 
(1995) in the specification of the IGM:  
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The level of provision of the public good depends on the competition between the pressure of 
groups that favour a higher level of provision (N1,...,i+) and groups that favour a lower level of 
provision (Ni+1,...,n-), and also on some specific institutional factors (I). Normally N is the 
number of members of each group. Institutional factors are, for example, the existence of 
referenda or the existence of specific legislation. 
 
I found in the literature some empirical studies that compared or combined the MVM with the 
IGM (MCOM is the combined specification): Congleton and Shughart II (1990); Shapiro and 
Papadakis (1993); Baumgardner (1993); Congleton and Bennett (1995); Ahmed (1998). 
These empirical studies reveal that the MVM seems to be stronger than the IGM when the tax 
system is simple (there is a tax that directly finance the provision of the public good), otherwise 
the IGM performs better. The majority does not control favours to interest groups when 
voters are not aware of public good provision costs. However, more research is necessary, 
namely in terms of other public goods. 
 
The specification that combines the two models (MCOM) is represented in Congleton and 
Bennett (1995) as:   6
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The overall demand for the public good is a weighed sum of the median voter demand with the 
relative power of interest groups where w1 can be seen as an index of democratisation of state 
politics. If  w1 0 = , then interest groups control public decisions. If  w1 1 = , the median voter is 
decisive and public decisions respond to her preferences. If  0 1 1 < < w , public choice results 
from the influence of both the median voter and interest groups. 
 
w1 cannot be estimated directly. However, I can test if its value is zero for the two models by 
using the  J test (Davidson and MacKinnon, 1981). I did the J test to compare the two 
models. If both models cannot be rejected, MCOM is the better specification. 
 
Additionally, I estimated MCOM as  the “non-nested” hypothesis, and did the F test to 
analyse if the addition of the explanatory variables of the competitor model to the MVM or to 
the IGM, would improve the fittings. 
 
These proceedings indicate which is the best specification (MVM, MGI or MCOM) for local 
public choice. 
 
3 – Hypotheses to be tested 
 
The hypotheses I empirically tested come from the theoretical discussion presented before: 
I - Public choice is controlled by the median voter (MVM). – HI 
II - Public choice is controlled by interest groups (IGM). - HII 
III - Public choice is the result of the combined influence of the median voter and interest 
groups (MCOM). - HIII 
IV  - In highly populated communities, interest groups have more influence in the local 
provision of public goods, than in small communities (free riding, informational problems, scale   7
of provision and urbanisation which can create better conditions for the organisation or 
attraction of interest groups). - HIV 
V - The price and income elasticity of the demand on public goods are small (usually lower 
than one) - HV. 
VI - There is congestion in the consumption of locally provided public goods. - HVI 
VII - The institutional shape of a political system affects public choice. Regarding that there are 
political and institutional differences between Portugal and Galicia, we can expect the existence 
of differences between the two territories in terms of the relative political power of the median 
voter and interest groups. - HVII 
 
Hypotheses I, II and III describe the choice of the best competing specification (MVM, IGM, 
or MCOM).  
 
Hypothesis IV follows the approaches of Olson (1965) and Becker (1983, 1985), who 
explained that small organised interest groups would obtain more success than large 
unorganised interest groups. Adding the approach of Meltzer and Richard (1981), we can 
look at the majority of voters as a large interest group, without the ability to proceed its 
interest, due to “free-riding” problems in getting organised (Olson´s argument). If this is true, 
the median voter would not be decisive, and interest group preferences would be dominating 
the demand side of the political market. In large municipalities the costs of organisation of the 
majority will be greater than in small municipalities, because each member of the latent group 
has stronger incentives to “free-ride”. Additionally, Murrell (1984) shows that, when the 
population increases, interest groups become fragmented into smaller and more homogeneous 
interest groups, with larger political power. The author also verified that some interest groups 
only appear when the dimension of the population is high enough. 
 
Another perspective that can justify HIV comes from Downs (1957) and Tullock (1967), who 
concluded that individuals are less interested in gathering information and in voting, when their 
probability of influencing the electoral results is lower. The larger the dimension of the 
population of any municipality is, the lower will be the probability of one voter influencing the 
final result, “cetiris paribus”. If this causes asymmetric abstinence among the distribution of   8
voters (ordered according to their income), and if the politicians do not know the distribution 
of the abstinence, the median voter will not be decisive. Then, politicians will be more tempted 
to a ttend to the demand of interest groups (constituted by interested voters) than to an 
unknown decisive voter, or a non-interested (not-informed) majority. 
 
Hypotheses V and VI are the result of various empirical applications of the MVM. They show 
that, normally, the price and income elasticity of the community demand on local public goods 
and services are low and that there is congestion in the consumption of locally provided public 
goods.  
 
Hypothesis VII was defined to test if the existence of political and institutional differences 
between Portugal and Galicia generate differences between the two territories, in terms of 
median voter and interest group political influence. One important institutional difference 
between Portugal and Galicia is the fact that in Spain (where the Galician municipalities are 
located) there is an intermediate government between the municipal and the central 
government (the regional government). In Portugal, the municipal government is the level of 
government immediately below the central government. So, in Galicia, non-centralised 
intervention is shared between the regional and the municipal government. According to Hoyt 
and Toma (1989), the “proximity” of a superior level of government can deviate interest group 
pressure from the lower level of government. That’s why I would not be surprised if the 
interest group model fit better to Portugal than to Galicia. 
 
4 - Results of the estimation of the MVM, the IGM and the MCOM 
 
In order to guarantee some homogeneity across the observations that constitute the sample for 
the application of the models, I divided the Portuguese and Galician municipalities into three 
groups of population dimension: DIMSMA (population of 0 to 7499 inhabitants); DIMMEAN 
(population of 7500 to 49999 inhabitants); PORTUGAL or GALICIA (all the municipalities 
of the territory). I estimated the MVM, the IGM and the MCOM for Portuguese (275) and 
Galician municipalities (314) for “per capita” local current expenditures
4 (1995 – Portugal;   9
1993  – Galicia
5) using OLS regressions (in logarithm form  – each independent variable 
coefficient is an elasticity)
6. 
 
Portuguese and Galician local political systems are of proportional representation (Hondt 
methodology) and “a priori” they are not indicated for the application of the MVM. However, 
in both, political candidates try to obtain a majority (50%+1), because otherwise, in practice, 
they have to share the executive power with the opposition. 
 
Portuguese and Galician municipalities are extremely dependant on unconditional transfers 
from the central government (more than 50% of current revenues) and they have little 
capability in differentiating from the other municipalities in fiscal terms (those issues in which 
municipalities have autonomy to differentiate are residual in terms of revenues). This causes a 
problem with the construction of the price variable of the demand of the community (MVM). 
As in the municipalities of Portugal and Galicia, the main category of local revenues are 
property taxes, and as their capability to differentiate in this issue is small, I considered the 
relative frequency of owners as a proxy to local taxpayers´ sensitivity to the tax price involved 
in the provision of local public services.  
 
The non-existence of data on the tax-share obliged me to consider in the MVM, the variable 
Transfers separately from the variable Income, which is equivalent to the introduction of the 
possibility of the “flypaper effect” in the configuration of the MVM regressions.  
 
In Portugal, it was not possible to acquire data on local median voter income. So, I had to use 
mean income (income “per capita” on the basis of income tax). For Galicia I found median 
income from data on municipal income distribution. I also found a high correlation (0,97) 
between median and mean income. I expect that the same occurs in Portugal and so, the 
substitution of median income by mean income will not cause relevant damage on the 
estimation results. 
   10
As I have already mentioned, the proxies to capture interest group influence are rather 
simplistic, so the IGM only captures a little of what might be bureaucratic and interest group 
influence. 
 
The independent variables of the MVM are, the income of the median voter (INCOME – 
expected signal +), the tax price (PRICE
7  - sensitivity of owners to local tax burden  – 
expected signal -), congestion in consumption (a parameter obtained from variable POPULA 
– population  – expected signal  -)
8 and unconditional current transfers from the central 
government (TRANSF  – expected signal +). In the IGM the strength of each group is 
measured by the number of members, or by weighing the expenditures the municipality has 
with group members on current expenditures of local government. I considered the following 
interest groups: bureaucracy, described as the salaries of  public employees on public 
expenditures (BUREAU – expected signal +), proportion of elderly people in the jurisdictions 
(PPOP65 – expected signal +) and groups with interests related to tourism (INDTUR - tourist 
activity in the municipality – expected signal +). 
 
For Bergstrom and Goodman (1973), with the same income and tax-share, the elderly people 
will probably demand more public goods than young people, assuming that the demand for 
public goods does not fall with the age. So, elderly people can be seen as an interest group 
(organised or latent) that prefers more public provision. Additionally, a high proportion of 
elderly people are retired and have more time, during each day, to enjoy some public goods 
like parks and public gardens, libraries, and cultural activities
9. 
 
In Portugal and Galicia the tourist sector is of extreme importance. The firms that develop 
activities related to tourism are spread across the municipalities according to their tourist 
attractiveness. In each municipality, the attraction of tourists interacts with the existence of 
quality in the provision of public services (water distribution, management of urban waste, 
provision of cultural services, maintenance of good roads, public lighting, parks and public 
gardens, municipal swimming-pools, cleaning of the beaches). For this reason I think that 
companies in tourist sector are interested in the improvement (quantity and quality) of the 
provision of public services (the expected signal is +).   11
 
In order to avoid problems of heteroscedasticity, I applied the correction of White to the 
results of standard deviations associated with the estimates of the coefficients of independent 
variables. 
 
In order to test the MVM against the IGM (and the IGM against the MVM) I did the J test 
(Davidson and McKinnon, 1981)
10. 
 
4.1 – Results of the estimation of the MVM 
 
Table 1 describes the results from the estimation of the MVM for Portugal and Galicia. 
 
Table 1 - Results from the estimation of the MVM for Portugal and Galicia 
  DIMSMA    DIMMEAN    Municipalities   
VARIABLES  PORTUGAL  GALICIA  PORTUGAL  GALICIA  PORTUGAL  GALICIA 
IND. TER.  0,84  -8,36**  0,50  -9,18*  -0,43  -9,60** 
  (0,44)  (-3,33)  (0,60)  (-2,60)  (-0,72)  (-4,85) 
INCOME  0,48**  0,73**  0,45**  0,64**  0,51**  0,77** 
  (5,85)  (4,83)  (7,93)  (2,38)  (13,56)  (7,76) 
PRICE  -0,03  -0,42*  -0,56**  -0,45  -0,44**  -0,49** 
  (-0,22)  (-2,15)  (-4,57)  (-1,33)  (-4,80)  (-3,36) 
POPULA  -0,87**  -0,60**  -0,69**  -0,53**  -0,71**  -0,57** 
  (-9,90)  (-16,08)  (-20,55)  (-7,52)  (-19,08)  (-32,51) 
TRANSF  0,65**  0,56**  0,55**  0,68**  0,61**  0,60** 
  (6,18)  (13,15)  (10,76)  (8,88)  (20,78)  (34,62) 
a  0,77  0,93  0,68  1,27  0,82  1,06 
Adjus. R
2  0,72  0,38  0,53  0,49  0,70  0,46 
F  35,13  32,24  50,14  15,95  164,57  58,72 
Nr OBSER  55  203  174  64  275  274 
** Statistically significant for a level of confidence of 99% 
* Statistically significant for a level of confidence of 95% 
t values in parentheses 
 
Results from Table 1 indicate that for Portugal and Galicia, the MVM provides a good fitting 
to explain municipal current expenditures for the three groups of municipalities. Comparing the 
results for the two territories, it is possible to see that the demand income elasticity is higher in 
Galicia than in Portugal, and that the price elasticity is similar. They are always inferior to one. 
Consumption congestion exists and it seems to be a little bit superior in Galicia.  
Another interesting difference between the territories is the existence of “flypaper effect” in 
Portuguese municipalities (transfers elasticity is larger than income elasticities), but not in   12
Galician municipalities. An explanation for this phenomenon may be the different interest group 
political power between the territories. 
 
The results obtained for the price elasticity, for the income elasticity and for the congestion 
parameter are in harmony with the MVM empirical literature. 
 
In order to have a better understanding of local public choice, I tried to find out if politicians 
can affect the expenditure levels, deviating public choice from median voter preferences. I 
included, in the MVM, two dummies to capture two political characteristics. Following Frey 
and Schneider (1978), Baum (1989) and Santos (1995), I included the variable DINCUMB, 
which is equal to one, when the president of the local government was re-elected and equal to 
zero, otherwise. I do not know the expected signal of the estimated coefficient for this variable 
might be, because it depends on the interest of the politician in spending more or less in the 
municipality. In Santos (1995) the variable was statistically significant for 95% of confidence 
and its relationship with current expenditures was negative. The inclusion of this variable can 
be justified by the “à priori” advantage of the incumbents to win the municipal elections, 
because new candidates are riskier for the electorate (not as well known) and because the 
incumbents have more opportunities to prepare and pass their messages.  
The results of the MVM in the regressions for “per capita” current expenditures in Portuguese 
and Galician municipalities, with the inclusion of  DINCUMB
11 (with and without the 
explanatory variable “unconditional transfers”, to avoid duplication with the “flypaper effect”), 
in all groups of municipalities, show that DINCUMB did not improve the MVM fitting. For the 
sample and the year of the analysis, the “incumbent political advantage” was not statistically 
significant. 
 
The other political dummy that I have included in the MVM in Portuguese and Galician 
municipalities, is DPODER, that takes value one when the president of the municipality was 
elected by the same party elected to rule the central government (party coincidence in political 
power between the local government and the central government)
12, and value of zero, 
otherwise. The inclusion of this variable is found in Bosch and Suárez-Pandiello (1994, 1995) 
and is justified by the fact that in political campaigns for municipal elections, it is frequent to see   13
municipal presidents that were elected by a political party different from the one that won the 
elections to the central government, to complain about not having as much support from 
central government aid as those where there is political party coincidence between central and 
local governments. I tried to find out if where there is political party coincidence, the “per 
capita” current expenditures are higher than in the other municipalities. The expected signal for 
DPODER is positive. 
The inclusion of DPODER in the MVM (with or without “unconditional transfers”) did not 
improve the fitting quality. DPODER was never statistically significant f or the level of 
confidence of 95% (the same occurred in the studies of Bosch and Suárez-Pandiello (1994, 
1995)). 
 
The weak results obtained from the inclusion of DINCUMB and DPODER in the MVM are 
not a surprise, because a more adequate perception of these  effects demands for the 
introduction of time in the analysis and the consideration of capital expenditures. The 
interaction of the central government with local governments is important mainly in relation to 
long term projects, which involve the sharing of capital funds. 
 
4.2 – Results of the estimation of the IGM 
 
Table 2 - Results from the estimation of the IGM for Portugal and Galicia 
  DIMSMA    DIMMEAN    Municipalities   
VARIABLES  PORTUGAL  GALICIA  PORTUGAL  GALICIA  PORTUGAL  GALICIA 
IND. TER.  5,30**  3,41**  4,94**  2,80**  5,21**  3,32** 
  (10,84)  (15,20)  (21,40)  (6,96)  (36,12)  (18,54) 
BUREAU  0,67  0,10  0,68**  0,34  0,60**  0,17 
  (1,78)  (0,73)  (4,96)  (1,52)  (4,97)  (1,51) 
PPOP65  0,67**  0,13  0,54**  -0,26  0,72**  0,06 
  (4,51)  (0,94)  (5,09)  (-1,21)  (11,56)  (0,79) 
INDTUR  0,02  0,07  0,02*  0,14*  0,02*  0,12** 
  (1,90)  (1,36)  (2,42)  (3,63)  (2,40)  (6,90) 
Adjus. R
2  0,23  0,00  0,22  0,22  0,42  0,15 
F  3,15  1,04  14,11  6,65  49,90  10,59 
Nr OBSER  22  97  137  60  202  163 
** Statistically significant for a level of confidence of 99% 
* Statistically significant for a level of confidence of 95% 
t values in parentheses 
 
Table 2 shows the results of the empirical application of the IGM to Portugal and to Galicia. 
For the municipalities of Galicia the model is not adequate. For DIMSMA, none of the 
independent variables are statistically significant and in DIMMEAN only INDTUR is   14
statistically significant with the expected signal. For the municipalities of Portugal, in the group 
DIMSMA only PPOP65 is statistically significant, but in DIMMEAN all the interest groups 
produce significant influence on “per capita” current expenditures of the municipalities. For 
both Portugal and Galicia the IGM performs better in larger municipalities. 
 
Comparing the two territories, we see that the IGM is clearly stronger for Portuguese 
municipalities. This result helps to understand the existence of flypaper effect in Portuguese 
municipalities and is in harmony with Hoyt and Toma (1989) hypothesis. The existence in 
Spain of an intermediary level of government disperses the pressure of local interest groups. 
 
As for the MVM, I estimated the IGM with the political institutional variables DINCUMB and 
DPODER, to infer if, in addition to interest group influence, politicians can affect local public 
choice. The results  I obtained to the IGM estimation are similar to those of the MVM 
estimation.  
 
4.3 – Results of the estimation of MCOM and from the J test 
 
Table 3 - Results from the estimation of the MCOM for Portugal and Galicia 
  DIMSMA    DIMMEAN    Municipalities   
VARIABLES  PORTUGAL  GALICIA  PORTUGAL  GALICIA  PORTUGAL  GALICIA 
IND. TER.  4,18  -13,10**  1,92  -5,07  1,73*  -9,99** 
  (0,98)  (-3,52)  (1,71)  (-1,08)  (2,02)  (-3,85) 
INCOME  0,28*  1,03**  0,39**  0,38  0,43**  0,81** 
  (2,46)  (5,22)  (6,87)  (1,64)  (11,45)  (7,08) 
PRICE  0,27  -0,45  -0,65**  -0,67*  -0,53**  -0,34* 
  (1,52)  (-1,71)  (-5,03)  (-2,14)  (-6,14)  (-2,12) 
POPULA  -0,89**  -0,58**  -0,59**  -0,52**  -0,52**  -0,61** 
  (-11,35)  (-11,33)  (-18,34)  (-8,88)  (-35,34)  (-34,16) 
LTCGC  0,51**  0,63**  0,42**  0,62**  0,37**  0,63** 
  (3,26)  (9,20)  (7,75)  (8,01)  (13,01)  (31,98) 
BUREAU  0,13  -0,02  0,24*  0,25  0,10  0,06 
  (0,54)  (-0,20)  (2,22)  (1,54)  (1,18)  (0,68) 
PPOP65  0,20*  0,25*  0,24**  -0,11  0,31**  0,12* 
  (2,30)  (2,52)  (3,18)  (-0,71)  (6,69)  (2,11) 
INDTUR  0,01  -0,01  0,02**  0,09**  0,02**  0,04** 
  (1,30)  (-0,24)  (3,39)  (3,09)  (4,17)  (2,68) 
Adjus. R
2  0,63  0,45  0,58  0,57  0,69  0,52 
F  6,21  12,13  28,21  12,33  65,70  26,31 
Nr OBSER  22  97  137  60  202  163 
** Statistically significant for a level of confidence of 99% 
* Statistically significant for a level of confidence of 95% 
t values in parentheses 
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In Table 3, we can see that the results from the estimation of MCOM are in harmony with the 
individual estimation of the MVM and the IGM. In Portuguese municipalities of the group 
DIMSMA, the MVM explanatory variables are stronger than the IGM explanatory variables. 
In the DIMMEAN group of municipalities both the MVM and the IGM explanatory variables 
are statistically significant. The results for Galicia are similar, but just one explanatory variable 
of the IGM, in DIMMEAN, is statistically significant (INDTUR). 
 
For Galicia, J test results indicate that in the DIMSMA group the IGM shall be rejected and 
the MVM shall not  (tIGM = 0,16 and tMVM = 8,87**). For DIMMEAN, the MVM and the 
IGM are not rejected  (tIGM = 3,50** and tMVM = 7,19**). The same occurs for Portuguese 
municipalities (DIMSMA - tIGM = 0,94 and tMVM = 5,28**; DIMMEAN - tIGM = 4,04** and 
tMVM = 10,87**). This similarity of results between Portugal and Galicia raises some doubts 
about the non-rejection of HVII. 
 
5  - Analysis of the defined hypotheses according to the estimation results of the 
MVM, the IGM and the MCOM 
 
HI; HII; HIII: Who controls local public choice: The median voter, interest groups or both? 
The results indicate that in small municipalities the median voter is decisive on “per capita” 
current expenditures of the municipalities in Portugal and Galicia (HI is not rejected). In larger 
municipalities both the median voter and interest groups influence local public choice (HIII is 
not rejected). HII is rejected for “per capita” current expenditures.  
 
HIV: Is interest group influence on local provision more effective in the more populated 
municipalities than in the small municipalities? HIV is not rejected for municipal “per capita” 
current expenditures (Portugal and Galicia). I tried to see if the predicted values of local “per 
capita” current expenditures are closer to their observed values, as the population increase 
(continuous test to the non-rejection of HIV). Population exhibit the expected signal, but the 
variable was not statistically significant for the level of 95% of confidence. 
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HV: Price and income elasticity of the demand estimated according to the MVM are small? 
The results indicate that HV shall not be rejected. 
 
HVI: Is there congestion in the consumption of locally provided public goods? The results 
indicate that HVI shall not be rejected. 
 
HVII: Are there differences between the two territories, in terms of the relative political 
power of the median voter and of interest groups, as a result of differences between their 
political and institutional configuration? 
In small municipalities, in both territories, the MVM performs better than the other models. 
The results of their estimation are similar in Portugal and in Galicia (HVII is rejected). In mean 
and large municipalities the IGM performs better in Portugal than in Galicia, but the J test 
indicates that in both territories the MCOM shall not be rejected (HVII is rejected). 
Are these results expressing that there aren’t relevant political and institutional differences 
between the territories? The analysis of the “per capita” current expenditures indicates that 
they are very much superior in Portuguese municipalities than in the Galician municipalities, but 
the median income is much superior in Galicia. On average, “per capita” current expenditures 
in Portuguese municipalities are superior to the Galician municipalities by more than 50%
13 
(more than 100% in DIMSMA municipalities). Portuguese municipalities receive more than 
two times the unconditional transfers from the central government that the Galician 
municipalities receive. These indicators show that the relative power of public intervention in 
Portuguese municipalities is substantially greater than in the Galician municipalities. The 
explanation of this difference can be found in the different political-institutional configuration of 
the two territories.  
I estimated the models, joining the municipalities of Portugal and Galicia, for all the groups of 
municipalities, with the inclusion of the “dummy” DTERRITO (that has the value one if the 
municipality belongs to Galicia and the value zero otherwise). The statistical significance of this 
variable indicates that, in addition to the power of the median voter or of interest groups, there 
are differences between the two territories (political, institutional, socio-economical) that affect 
the levels of municipal “per capita” current expenditures. The results of all the regressions 
indicate that DTERRITO is always statistically  significant for 95% of confidence and its   17
estimated coefficient is negative (Galician municipalities show lower “per capita” current 
expenditures - the estimated coefficient of DTERRITO varies between  -1,08 and -0,21). 
These results produce more evidence about the rejection of HVII, because they make it clear 
that it is not the lack of institutional differences between the territories that creates similar 
results in the competition between the median voter and interest groups. 
 
I tried to identify if the level of visibility of the local tax system is a relevant institutional 
difference between the territories (fiscal illusion hypothesis). One hypothesis to explain the 
strong significance of DTERRITO could be the differences between the territories in terms of 
fiscal institutional system. That would originate different levels of tax visibility in Portugal and in 
Galicia. Maybe this could explain the disparities in local “per capita” current expenditures 
between the territories. Several authors used Herfindahl indexes to measure the fiscal visibility 
of the tax system (see for instance, Pommerehne and Schneider, 1978; Baker, 1983; Turnbull 
and Djoundourian, 1994; and Ahmed, 1998). The procedure consists in weighing each local 
tax revenue on total local tax revenues, squaring each parcel, and adding them. When almost 
all the local tax revenue comes from just one fiscal source, the index (that varies between zero 
and one) takes a value near a unit; in this case fiscal complexity is low and, so, fiscal visibility is 
high. In municipalities where local tax revenues are fragmented through many taxes, the value 
of the index is low; fiscal visibility is also low. In this case we expect more “per capita” current 
expenditures, than in the case where visibility is high, “cetiris paribus”.  
 
I constructed the Herfindhal indexes for Portugal and Galicia, including the maximum fiscal 
fragmentation that the published information permitted (property taxes, taxes on the circulation 
of vehicles, other local taxes). In Portugal and Galicia a problem comes from the parcel “other 
taxes”, which is not a residual category, but one that includes more local taxes revenues (on 
average 62% in Portuguese municipalities and 41% in Galician municipalities). When the 
parcel “other taxes” is very high, the value of the Herfindahl index will also be high. This 
indicates that the system is not very complex, so the fiscal visibility will be high. However, if the 
tax revenue represented in “other taxes” is very fragmented across many fiscal sources (as it 
happens in Portugal and Galicia), this means that the tax system is complex. This paradox can 
be overtaken by analysing the fiscal visibility by the weight of the residual category of taxes. As   18
the parcel “other taxes” includes many types of less important fiscal fonts (taxes on economic 
activities, revenues from water provision, tariffs on the use of car-parks, receipts from the 
concession of licences for the construction of buildings, or the opening of businesses...), the 
more the local revenues are born in a large range of fiscal fonts, represented in the proportion 
of “other taxes” (LPESORCM), the greater is the local fiscal complexity. 
 
After some proceedings to allow the simultaneous estimation of the models to Portugal and 
Galicia
14 I obtained the results expressed in Table 4. 
 
Table 4 - Results of the estimation of the MVM, the IGM and the MCOM, simultaneously for 
the two territories, with the inclusion of the level of local fiscal visibility 
Explanat.    MVM      IGM      MCOM   
Variables.  DIMSMA  DIMMEAN  ALL  DIMSMA  DIMMEAN  ALL  DIMSMA  DIMMMEAN  ALL 
Ind. Term  -1,20  -2,31  -3,20**  11,37**  11,51**  11,53**  -1,84  -0,87  -2,75** 
  (-0,78)  (-1,79)  (-4,13)  (79,32)  (64,74)  (116,11)  (-1,16)  (-0,63)  (-3,25) 
Income  0,53**  0,48**  0,53**  ----------  ----------  ----------  0,51**  0,42**  0,50** 
  (4,82)  (8,62)  (11,38)  ----------  ----------  ----------  (4,82)  (7,38)  (10,72) 
Price  -0,23  -0,55**  -0,42**  ----------  ----------  ----------  -0,29  -0,47**  -0,42** 
  (-1,37)  (-4,49)  (-4,65)  ----------  ----------  ----------  (-1,72)  (3,74)  (-4,62) 
Populat.  -0,62**  -0,72**  -0,68**  ----------  ----------  ----------  -0,59**  -0,77**  -0,70** 
  (-12,00)  (-13,11)  (-23,36)  ----------  ----------  ----------  (-9,54)  (-11,85)  (-19,74) 
Transf  0,57**  0,69**  0,69**  ----------  ----------  ----------  0,59**  0,68**  0,69** 
  (10,75)  (10,33)  (19,72)  ----------  ----------  ----------  (10,59)  (9,57)  (18,21) 
Bureau.  ----------  ----------  ----------  -0,14  0,52**  0,13  -0,27**  0,25**  -0,11* 
  ----------  ----------  ----------  (-1,89)  (4,34)  (1,95)  (-4,34)  (2,65)  (-2,24) 
Elderly  ----------  ----------  ----------  0,24**  0,29**  0,38**  0,07  -0,08  0,03 
  ----------  ----------  ----------  (2,83)  (3,26)  (7,44)  (0,80)  (-0,93)  (0,56) 
Tourism  ----------  ----------  ----------  0,09**  0,08**  0,11**  0,05*  0,07**  0,08** 
  ----------  ----------  ----------  (3,46)  (2,98)  (5,15)  (2,48)  (3,17)  (4,48) 
Territory  -0,99**  -0,71**  -0,78**  -0,80**  -0,20**  -0,41**  -1,01**  -0,64**  -0,81** 
  (-6,24)  (-8,52)  (-11,66)  (-13,19)  (-4,03)  (-11,46)  (-6,67)  (7,63)  (-12,15) 
LPESORCM  0,23**  -0,02  0,19**  0,40**  0,24*  0,51**  0,21**  -0,00  0,20** 
  (3,21)  (-0,22)  (4,19)  (4,66)  (2,55)  (8,90)  (3,08)  (-0,06)  (4,27) 
a  0,94  0,93  1,02  --------  --------  --------  --------  --------  -------- 
Adjust. R
2  0,73  0,56  0,67  0,61  0,23  0,39  0,76  0,58  0,68 
F  116,16  50,52  183,67  76,92  15,22  70,74  85,40  37,91  127,95 
Observat..  257  238  548  248  238  538  248  238  538 
** Statistically significant for a level of confidence of 99% 
* Statistically significant for a level of confidence of 95% 
t values in parentheses 
 
Table 4 shows that L PESORCM is statistically significant for 95% of confidence and its 
estimated coefficient exhibits the expected signal in seven of the nine regressions. Table 4 
indicates that we should not reject that the level of local fiscal visibility influences the levels of 
“per capita” current expenditures in each municipality, especially in DIMSMA municipalities.   19
When LPESORCM was included separately in the regressions of Portugal and Galicia, I 
found an interesting difference between the territories. In Portuguese m unicipalities the 
variable, either wasn’t statistically significant, or, despite its significance, the signal was 
opposite to what I expected
15 In Galician municipalities, the variable was always statistically 
significant, with its estimated coefficient exhibiting the expected signal
16. According to these 
results, the level of fiscal complexity affects the “per capita” current expenditures of Galician 
municipalities, but not those of Portuguese municipalities. Alternative measures of fiscal illusion 
and improvements in the discrimination of local fiscal fonts would certainly contribute to a 
better understanding of the phenomenon. 
 
6 - Conclusions 
 
I estimated the median voter model, the interest group influence model and a combined form 
to the municipalities of Galicia and Portugal. The results are in harmony with the empirical 
literature about the tested models. They provide some empirical evidence on the ability of 
interest groups in influencing public choice, but they also indicate that voters (namely the 
median voter) are important and avoid strong “deviations” to their preferences. The results 
also indicate that interest groups are more influential in more populated municipalities. 
 
On the contrary to what I expected, differences in the institutional shape of the political 
systems I have examined, do not affect the “trade-off” between the median voter and interest 
groups political power. 
 
The inclusion in the models of a “proxy” for fiscal visibility revealed the existence of some 
differences between Portugal and Galicia. While in the first territory, the complexity of the tax 
system does not seem to affect municipal “per capita” current expenditures, in Galicia the 
same does not occur. Differences in terms of the institutional configuration of the “fiscal 
machine” between the territories may explain the phenomenon. The use of alternative 
measures of fiscal illusion may be required to clarify these results. 
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Future research on these issues shall involve time and capital expenditures, because the 
possibility of time lags in agents´ reactions or the existence of political cycles was not captured 
in the models. Additionally, the direct inquiry of politicians about the level of pressure they feel 
from interest groups and media can be useful for future empirical specification of interest group 
models. Additional emphasis on supply conditions is also required.   21
 
                                                 
1 The variable G* is the output level of provision of the public good in each community. Normally it is 
difficult to measure the output of public goods, so almost all empirical studies use the “per capita” 
spending (input) which finance the provision of the good. The variable tm is the tax share of the median 
voter and captures the tax price the median voter has to pay for the provision of the public good. The 
variable ym is the income of the household with median income in each community. The variable N is the 
population of the community and captures the level of congestion in the consumption of the good. If there 
is congestion the good is not a pure public good, if not, there is no rivalry in its consumption, which 
reveals that it is a pure public good. The variables Zk are a range of socio-economic variables that capture 
the influence of specific characteristics of each community. 
2 For example: Borcherding and Deacon (1972), Bergstrom and Goodman (1973), Pommerehne and Frey 
(1976), Pommerehne and Schneider (1978), Costa (1982), Deno and Mehay (1987), Holcombe (1989), 
Turnbull and Mitias (1995), Turnbull and Chang (1998), among many others. 
3 There are also studies that combine the two ways of contributing to the campaigns of the candidates (see 
Grier and Munger, 1991, and Krozner and Stratmann, 1998). 
4 Capital expenditures are not adequate for cross-sectional analysis of expenditures (based on the analysis 
of only one year). 
5 Most recent years with available data. 
6 Data for the variables can be seen in Cruz (2000). 
7 % of property occupied by owners. 
8 a varies from 0 to 1. If a = 0, there is not rivalry in consumption; if a = 1, the good is “private”. 
9 Ahmed (1998) refers to some empirical studies where the variable was used as a “proxy” to interest group 
influence 
10 The test J was done to DIMSMA and DIMMEAN. 
11 For Galician municipalities we did not find information about the name of the “alcaide” (president) of 
each municipality. So we used the dummy DREPPVEN, that is equal to 1 if the party that won the municipal 
elections had also been the winner in the preceding electoral cycle, and to zero, otherwise. For the 
Portuguese municipalities the correlation between DINCUMB and DREPPVEN is positive and equal to 
0,60. For Galician municipalities we do not expect such a strong correlation, because if the most voted 
party did not get majority, a coalition between the other parties can elect the president of the local 
government (“alcaide”). 
12 In Galician municipalities, DPODERGC apprehends the coincidence between the political winner party in 
municipal elections and the central government political winner party; DPODERCA, indicates coincidence 
between the political winner party in municipal elections and the regional government (Autonomous 
Community government) political winner party. Note, however,  that the winner party in municipal 
elections may not elect the president of the municipality, if it did not obtain the majority of votes and if the 
minority parties ally themselves to elect the “alcaide”. 
 
13 Corrected for the same year of analysis (1995) and according to the “Purchasing Power Parities” in 1995 
between  “escudos” and “pesetas”. 
14 See Cruz (2000: pag. 561 nt. 187). 
15 It happens in the MVM and in the MCOM for DIMMEAN - this explains the non-significance of the 
variable in these regressions represented in Table 4. 
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